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tutional standard, the Supreme Court should hold that federal welfare funding is conditioned upon waiver of a state's eleventh amendment immunity.
JEFFREY LYNN WILLIS

THE STANDARDS FOR ENFORCEABILITY OF
JOHN DOE SUMMONSES OF THIRD PARTY
RECORDS RELATING TO THE AFFAIRS OF
UNIDENTIFIED TAXPAYERS
The Secretary of the Treasury and his delegates in the Internal
Revenue Service have broad inquisitorial powers' "to proceed . . .
and inquire after and concerning all persons. . . who may be liable
to pay any internal revenue tax .... ,,2 This language "flatly imposes upon the Secretary the duty to canvass and to inquire."' Chief
among the procedural mechanisms with which he is to exercise his
powers of inquisition is § 7602 of the Internal Revenue Code. This
section authorizes the internal revenue agent to summon any person
who may be liable for an internal revenue tax or any person having
possession, custody, or care of the books of the person liable for the
tax, to appear before him and produce such books, papers, records,
or other data, and to give such testimony, under oath, as may be
relevant or material to such inquiry.' This broad statutory language
'De Masters v. Arend, 313 F.2d 79, 88 (9th Cir. 1963); Falsone v. United States,
205 F.2d 734, 742 (5th Cir. 1953); see Ritholz, The Commissioner's Inquisitorial
Powers, 45 TAXES 582 (1967).
2INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 7601(a).
3
Donaldson v. United States, 400 U.S. 517, 523 (1971).
'INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 7602, provides:
For the purpose of ascertaining the correctness of any return, making a return where none has been made, determining the liability of
any person for any internal revenue tax or the liability at law or in
equity of any transferee or fiduciary of any person in respect of any
internal revenue tax, or collecting any such liability the Secretary or
his delegate is authorized(1) To examine any books, papers, records, or other data which may
be relevant or material to such inquiry;
(2) To summons the person liable for tax or required to perform the
act, or any officer or employee of such person, or any person having
possession, custody, or care of books of account containing entries
relating to the business of the person liable for tax or required to
perform the act, or any other person the Secretary or his delegate may
deem proper, to appear before the Secretary or his delegate at a time
and place named in the summons and to produce such books, papers,
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authorizes summonses directed at taxpayers themselves, 5 third parties in possession of records relating to the business of an identified
taxpayer' or taxpayers, 7 or third parties in possession of records relating to the business of an unidentified taxpayer" or taxpayers. 9
These grants of power of investigation to the Internal Revenue
Service are liberally construed in recognition of the vital public purposes they serve and the policy against judicial intervention in the
investigative stages of tax matters."' However, the § 7602 summons
will not be enforced" if it either is unauthorized by the statute or
infringes upon the constitutional prohibition against unreasonable
searches and seizures established by the fourth amendment.' 2 Judirecords, or other data, and to give such testimony, under oath, as may
be relevant or material to such inquiry; and
(3) To take such testimony of the person concerned, under oath, as
may be relevant or material to such inquiry.
5INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 7602(2).
'Venn v. United States, 400 F.2d 207 (5th Cir. 1968); United States v. Harrington,
388 F.2d 520 (2d Cir. 1968); Foster v. United States, 265 F.2d 183 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 360 U.S. 912 (1959).
States v. Dauphin Deposit Trust Co., 385 F.2d 129 (3d Cir. 1967), cert.
denied, 390 U.S. 921 (1968); First Nat'l Bank v. United States, 160 F.2d 532 (5th Cir.
1947); United States v. First Nat'l Bank, 173 F. Supp. 716 (W.D. Ark. 1959).
'Shulze v. Rayunec, 350 F.2d 666 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, Boughner v. Shulze, 382
U.S. 919 (1965); Tillotson v. Boughner, 333 F.2d 515 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S.
913 (1964).
'United States v. Turner, CCH 1973 STAND. FED. TAX REP., U.S. TAX CAS. (73-2,
at 81,536)
9489 (7th Cir. 1973); United States v. Theodore, 479 F.2d 749 (4th Cir.
1973); United States v. Anderson Clayton and Co., 73-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 81,109 (S.D.
Miss. 1973); United States v. Berkowitz, 355 F. Supp. 897 (E.D. Pa. 1973); ef. United
States v. Humble Oil and Refining Co., 346 F. Supp. 944 (S.D. Tex. 1972), appeal
docketed, No. 72-3029, 5th Cir,, Sept. 25, 1972.
'"De Masters v. Arend, 313 F.2d 79, 87 (9th Cir. 1963); Falsone v. United States,
205 F.2d 734, 742 (5th Cir. 1953).
"After service of the summons the witness or any interested party may attack the
summons before the hearing officer. If the challenge to the summons is rejected by the
hearing officer and the witness still refuses to testify or produce the documents, the
hearing officer has no power to enforce compliance or impose sanctions for failure to
comply. Reisman v. Caplin, 375 U.S. 440, 445 (1964). To obtain enforcement of the
summons the agent must proceed under Internal Revenue Code § 7402(b), which
grants jurisdiction to the district courts to compel attendance, testimony or production. This enforcement action is an "adversary proceeding affording a judicial determination of the challenges to the summons and giving complete protection to the witness." 375 U.S. at 446. A refusal to comply with the order of the district court resulting
from this proceeding subjects the witness to contempt proceedings. Id.
'"U.S. CONST. amend. IV provides: "The right of people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall
not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by
7United
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cial protection against the unreasonable summons has been held to
be particularly appropriate when the summons was directed at a
third party who had dealings with a single identified taxpayer under
investigation. 3 Since the reasonableness of this type of third party
summons has been subject to closer evaluation than summonses directed at the taxpayer himself, it is logical that the reasonableness
of a summons directed at a third party who had dealings with multiple unidentified taxpayers should be subject to the closest scrutiny.
The latter type of summons, described as an inquiry into the "tax
Fourth
liability of John Doe and Others"' 4 was examined in the recent
5
Circuit Court of Appeals case, United States v. Theodore.1
In 1972 the Internal Revenue Service initiated a nationwide project, entitled the "Tax Return Preparers Project," to investigate the
6
accuracy of tax returns prepared for clients by tax return preparers.'
Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized."
":United States v. Harrington, 388 F.2d 520, 523 (2d Cir. 1968).
"The IRS utilizes a pre-printed form summons, IRS Form 2039, which contains
In the John Doe
the heading "Summons: In the matter of the tax liability of _."
summons cases involving multiple unknown taxpayers the blank was filled in: "John
Doe and others." E.g., United States v. Humble Oil and Refining Co., 346 F. Supp.
944, 948, app. A (S.D. Tex. 1972), appeal docketed, No. 72-3029, 5th Cir., Sept. 25,
1972.
1479 F.2d 749 (4th Cir. 1973).
"The opinion in Theodore provided an excellent summary of the program:
In an effort to strike at one source of tax cheating, IRS initiated
in 1972 a nationwide project to investigate individual professional tax
preparers to determine whether they were filing accurate returns for
their clients. To this end, special agents of the IRS's Intelligence Division, posing as ordinary customers, were sent to the offices of selected
preparers. In this guise, the undercover agent would provide the preparer with all the information needed to complete a return. The preparer's work product would then be audited carefully to determine
whether he had used accurately the information furnished him. If it
appeared that the information had been used improperly but there
was insufficient evidence of wrongdoing to warrant immediate criminal prosecution, the case would be transferred to IRS's Audit Division.
The Audit Division then promptly would issue a cease and desist
order and ask the suspect preparer for copies of all other returns prepared by him. The alleged purpose of this request was to ascertain
whether the suspect preparer had erred in computing the tax liabilities of his other clients as well. IRS would resort to a section 7602
summons to compel production only if a preparer refused voluntarily
to make available for audit the requested information. If, during the
course of IRS's auditing the returns of the preparer's other clients,
errors in computing tax liabilities were uncovered, the affected taxpayers would be contacted to pay additional tax. And, if sufficient
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In the course of this project, an IRS undercover agent posing as a
client visited the Theodore Accounting Service seeking assistance in
the preparation of his tax return. The Theodore firm prepared the
return, which was subsequently audited by the IRS revealing that an
incorrect tax refund had been requested. The IRS issued a cease and
desist order and requested access to all records of the Theodore firm,
relating to all tax returns prepared from 1969 through 1971, to enable
the IRS to determine the correctness of the returns. Charles Theodore, as Vice-President of the firm, refused to provide the requested
information and a John Doe administrative summons 7 was issued
pursuant to § 7602.18 Theodore refused to comply with the summons
and the IRS sought and obtained from the district court an order to
enforce the summons."9 On appeal, the Fourth Circuit reversed the
order, concluding its examination of the reasonableness of the summons under the fourth amendment with an interpretation of § 7602
which allowed the IRS to summon only information related to the
correctness of a particular return or to a particular person. In accordance with this interpretation the court found that the summons directing Theodore "to produce all of the returns and all of the work
records relating to all of his clients for the years 1969-1971 [was] too
broad and too vague to be enforced." ' " The court remanded the case
to the district court to determine whether the summons should be
enforced to the extent that it sought only the names and social secu2
rity numbers of the clients of the accounting service. '
evidence were collected during the investigation to support criminal
prosecution of the tax preparer involved, the matter would be referred
back to the Intelligence Division for that purpose.
479 F.2d at 751-52; see note 43 infra.
"The summons demanded:
(1) All accounting records, workpapers, correspondence, memoranda
and other documents in the possession of or used by Theodore Accounting Service, PA, in connection with the preparation of all Federal income tax returns for customers and clients of Theodore Accounting Service, PA, for the years 1969, 1970 and 1971.
(2) All retained copies of 1969, 1970 and 1971 Federal income tax
returns, the originals of which were prepared by Theodore Accounting
Service, PA, for customers and clients of Theodore Accounting Service, PA.
Brief for Appellant at 14, Brief for Appellee at 3, United States v. Theodore, 479 F.2d
749 (4th Cir. 1973).
1479 F.2d at 752.
"United States v. Theodore, 347 F. Supp. 1070 (D.S.C. 1972).
2"479 F.2d at 755.

21id.
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The Fourth Amendment and the Administrative Summons Power
In Theodore, the Fourth Circuit conceded that the fourth amendment does not require that an administrative summons meet a "probable cause" standard in order to be enforceable.12 Nonetheless, the
court seemed to rely upon the remaining fourth amendment protection against unreasonable searches and seizures2 when it found the
investigative and inquisitorial powers of the IRS were limited to
something less than an "unrestricted license to rummage through the
office files of an accountant in the hope of perchance discovering
information that would result in increased tax liabilities for some as
'2
yet unidentified client.
The standard for determining the reasonableness of administrative summonses have their origin in cases concerning the judicial
enforcement of administrative summonses of corporate books and
records.? These cases demonstrate that the evolution of the investigative powers of administrative agencies has been accompanied by the
"479 F.2d at 754, citing United States v. Powell, 379 U.S. 48 (1964).
21In 1886 the Supreme Court held that an actual entry upon premises and search
for and seizure of papers was not required to constitute an unreasonable search and
seizure within the meaning of the fourth amendment; a compulsory production of a
private party's books and papers could be sufficient. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S.
616 (1886).
2-479 F.2d at 754.
2In an attempt to raise jurisdictional objections to the summons which was addressed to Charles Theodore in person, and to invoke his personal fifth amendment
protection against self-incrimination, Theodore tried to demonstrate the incapacity of
Theodore Accounting Service, P.A., as a professional association under South Carolina
law. The attempt was futile and the Fourth Circuit made short shrift of the argument
with the rationale that Theodore Accounting Service, P.A., "held itself out to the
general public and to the governments of South Carolina and the United States as a
professional association" and was to be "estopped from denying the existence and
viability of its corporate entity." 479 F.2d at 752-53. Despite that rationale the court
was not consistently explicit in its treatment of Theodore's office files as corporate
books and records. The court evidently treated the office files as corporate books and
records when it denied Charles Theodore the right to assert his personal fifth amendment protection against self-incrimination as grounds for refusing to produce corporate
records. However, in finding the summons too broad and vague to be enforced, the
court did not clarify whether or not it was treating the files as corporate books and
records or simply as the records of a third party which were relevant to the tax liability
of its clients. Id. at 754-55. Nevertheless, since the standards for enforceability of
administrative summonses evolved in cases concerning the judicial enforcement of
administrative summonses of corporate books and records, a review of those cases
provides a background for an analysis of Theodore. Those evolved standards are used
in both individual and corporate third party summons cases. Compare United States
v. Harrington, 388 F.2d 520 (2d Cir. 1968), with Foster v. United States, 265 F.2d 183
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 360 U.S. 912 (1959).
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diminution of the fourth amendment protection against unreasonable
searches and seizures of corporate books and records through the use
of broad summonses. Although early cases rejected the wholesale
demands of overbroad summonses as constituting unreasonable interruptions of business or "fishing expeditions"26 into private papers,
the fourth amendment does not now restrict an administrative summons for records, except for limitations concerning breadth and relevance.Y
A currently valid 2 summary of the authorities on enforceability
of administrative summonses of corporate books and records was
compiled by the Supreme Court in Oklahoma Press Publishing Co.
v.Walling." The Wage and Hour Administrator had sought the production of specified records of the corporation to determine the coverage of the Fair Labor Standards Act and to ascertain whether, if
coverage existed, there were any violations thereunder. The Court
held that an inquiry to determine coverage and violations was not
violative of the fourth amendment if the inquiry by the agency was
authorized by law, was not too broad or indefinite, and if the materials particularly specified were relevant. "The gist of the protection
[was] in the requirement, expressed in terms, that the disclosure
'30
sought [should] not be unreasonable.
The investigative arm of administrative agencies was further unfettered in United States v. Morton Salt Co., 31 which substantially
eroded "the colorful and nostalgic slogan 'no fishing expeditions.' ",32
The Federal Trade Commission had previously sought and obtained
a judicial decree ordering compliance with an administrative order to
cease and desist from stated practices in connection with the pricing,
producing and marketing of salt and to file reports showing compliance. :" In Morton Salt the Federal Trade Commission sought enforcement of an administrative summons which required the corporation
to file highly particularized reports showing compliance with the
cease and desist order, in addition to those reports required by the
enforcement decree itself. The Supreme Court enforced the summons
recognizing the inquisitorial powers of the administrative agency to
1'FTC v. American Tobacco Co., 264 U.S. 298, 306 (1924). See also Hale v. Henkel,
201 U.S. 43, 77 (1906).
K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 3.02, at 55 (3d ed. 1972).
Id. at § 3.07, at 65.
-327 U.S. 186 (1946).
'Id. at 208.
1338 U.S. 632 (1950).
12
d. at 642.
"Salt Producers Ass'n v. FTC, 134 F.2d 354 (7th Cir. 1943).
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conduct original inquiry. If the agency acted within the powers delegated to it by statute, it had authority to take steps to inform itself
as to whether there was a probable violation of the law. 3 The Supreme Court stated that the residual fourth amendment protection
from unreasonable governmental investigation into the corporation's
affairs applies only if that investigation is of "such a sweeping nature
and so unrelated to the matter properly under inquiry as to exceed
the investigatory power" of the agency.:5
The legislation authorizing the summons power of the IRS and the
judicial enforcement orders construing that power are consistent with
the historical development of the administrative investigative power
in relation to the fourth amendment protection of corporate books
and records. Section 7602 provides that the books, papers, records
and other data summoned must be relevant or material to the inquiry.:", In United States v. Powell,"7 a landmark case on judicial
enforcement of IRS summonses, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve "the differing views in the circuits on the standards the
Internal Revenue Service must meet to obtain judicial enforcement
of its orders. '' "' The Court set forth the standards that the investigation must be for a legitimate purpose and the inquiry must be relevant to that purpose.3 9 Coupled with the pervasive requirements of
1338 U.S. at 642-43. The Court described the administrative summons power as
the power to get information from those who best can give it and who
are most interested in not doing so. Because judicial power is reluctant
if not unable to summon evidence until it is shown to be relevant to
issues in litigation, it does not follow that an administrative agency
charged with seeing that the laws are enforced may not have and
exercise powers of original inquiry. It has a power of inquisition, if one
chooses to call it that, which is not derived from the judicial function.
It is more analogous to the Grand Jury, which does not depend on a
case or controversy for power to get evidence but can investigate
merely on suspicion that the law is being violated, or even just because
it wants assurances that it is not. When investigative and accusatory
duties are delegated by statute to an administrative body, it, too, may
take steps to inform itself as to whether there is probable violation of
the law.
Id.
"Id. at 652, citing FTC v. American Tobacco Co., 264 U.S. 298 (1924).
IINT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 7602.
;379 U.S. 48 (1964).
:"Id. at 50-51.
-"Id.at 57-58. The Supreme Court further required in Powell that the information
sought not be already in the possession of the IRS and that the proper administrative
steps required by the code be followed. Id. The former requirement is discussed at note
114 infra in the discussion of the remand in Theodore and the latter is inapposite to
this inquiry.
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reasonableness and particularity supplied by the fourth amendment, " the Powell standards have provided the lower federal courts
with guidelines for determining the enforceability of IRS summonses
of corporate or private records.
In the Tax Return Preparers Project, as it affected Theodore, the
IRS was pursuing the legitimate purpose of canvassing and inquiring
after all persons who might be liable to pay an internal revenue tax.4'
The Government argued that all records sought were relevant to the
authorized inquiry, the purpose of which was to investigate the liabilities of the allegedly narrow class of taxpayers who had had their
returns prepared by Theodore Accounting Service during 1969, 1970
and 1971.42 The Government asserted that there was "far more than
an idle hope that some, if not a very large number, of the returns
prepared by Theodore would be incorrect." 3 Nevertheless, despite
the strong administrative interest in the collection of substantial potential tax deficiencies and the increased judicial tolerance of administrative summonses, the Fourth Circuit refused to enforce fully the
summons in Theodore. The rationale underlying this refusal cannot
be discerned solely from the precedental perspective of the constitutionally protected privacy of corporate records.
The Enforceability of Third Party Summonses
The Fourth Circuit's analysis of the enforceability of the summons in Theodore is more clearly discernible from the added perspective of the relationship between the parties involved. The tax liabili"'See note 12 supra.
"INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 7601(a).

"2 Brief for Appellee at 16-17, United States v. Theodore, 479 F.2d 749 (4th Cir.
1973).
"3 Id. See also Harless, Taxpayer Assistance and the Tax Practitioner,135 J.
ACCOUNT. 79 (1973). This article, written by a deputy commissioner of Internal Revenue, strongly supports the Government's contention. Harless stated that by 1969, 5(
percent of the individual returns carried the signature of a preparer, and probably
another 20 percent received assistance without carrying a signature. Although there is
no available count of return preparers the estimates reach 200,000.
The author likened the Tax Return Preparer's Project to "turning over a rock." The
IRS made 3,241 undercover contacts during the 1972 filing period, one-third on preparers the IRS had definite reason to suspect, and the remainder on those indulging in
false and misleading advertising or appearing questionable. Approximately 60 percent
of the returns prepared reflected improprieties.
Follow-up investigations included audits of all returns prepared by the suspected
preparer and the preparers' own returns. The IRS examined 163,853 returns prepared
by 2,297 preparers and collected tax deficiencies and penalties amounting to
$30,381,000.
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ties under examination were those of Theodore's clients. Theodore
was a third party in possession of records allegedly relevant to potential tax liabilities of its taxpayer clients. The Fourth Circuit displayed its cognizance of the importance of this relationship" by reliance upon the important third party IRS summons case, United
States v. Harrington." The court stated, "[the] judicial protection
against the sweeping or irrelevant order is particularly appropriate in
matters where the demand for records is directed not to the taxpayer
but to a third party who may have had some dealing with the person
under investigation."46 The battery of tests for ascertaining the enforceability of the summons in the third party case is strikingly similar to that in the simple corporate books and records cases; but the
courts have been more circumspect in approving the summons.
Section 7602 authorizes the IRS to summon any third party having "possession, custody, or care of books of account containing entries relating to the business of the person liable for tax . . . to produce such . . . data . . . . as may be relevant or material"4 7 to the
inquiry into the potential liability of the taxpayer. The cases considering summonses under this statute or other similar administrative
summonses of third party records have consistently enumerated two
requisites for enforceability: the information sought must be relevant
and the burden on the third party must not be onerous in the produc48
tion of the information, either in the sense of a financial burden or
in the sense of a tedious and extensive interruption of his business49
11479 F.2d at 754.

35388 F.2d 520 (2d Cir. 1968). In Harringtonthe court enforced an IRS summons
compelling an attorney to produce records of receipt and disbursement of alimony to
his client, the divorced wife of the taxpayer under investigation.
"Id. at 523.
"INT.

Rzv. CODE

OF

1954,

§

7602(2).

OUnited States v. First Nat'l Bank, 173 F. Supp. 716 (W.D. Ark. 1959); see United
States v. Dauphin Deposit Trust Co., 385 F.2d 129, 130 (3d Cir. 1967), cert. denied,
390 U.S. 921 (1968). In First Nat'l Bank the summons sought extensive bank records
of all individual or corporate accounts in the names of four taxpayers, or in which each
or either had an interest, regardless of the designation. The bank conducted tests to
determine the man hours necessary to identify the accounts in which the taxpayers
had an interest and concluded that its cost would exceed $30,000. The court held that
the corporation could not be compelled to bear such a financial burden. Insofar as the
summons necessitated such expense, it was unreasonable and void. 173 F. Supp. at
720-21.
"McMann v. SEC, 87 F.2d 377, 379 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, McMann v. Engel, 301
U.S. 684 (1937); accord, United States v. Dauphin Deposit Trust Co., 385 F.2d 129,
131 (3d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 921 (1968). In McMann the summons ordered
a broker to produce records relating to the transactions of its customer. The customer
sued to prevent the broker's compliance and the SEC intervened. In finding that the
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necessitated by the compulsory reproduction or identification of relevant documents. Groping inquiries, in which the IRS summons was
either lacking in specificity "' or out of proportion to the end sought "'
and in which the limits of the investigation were determined on the
basis of information obtained as the inquiry proceeded, "1 2 have been
particularly condemned.
Conversely, those investigations motivated by logical inferences of
relevance based upon the connection between the affairs of the taxpayer under investigation and those of the third party' have encountered little judicial reluctance toward enforcement. The appropriate
question
is whether from what the Government already knows there
exists the requisite nexus between taxpayer and records of another's affairs to make the investigation reasonable-in short,
whether the "might" in the articulated standard, "might
throw light upon the correctness of the return," is in the particular circumstances an indication of a realistic expectation
summons did not constitute an unreasonable search, the court observed that the documents demanded were few and their production did not interfere with the business of
the company. In Dauphin Deposit Trust the court determined that compliance with
an IRS summons would not be unduly burdensome since the bank's obligation could
be fulfilled by giving an IRS agent access to the relevant files, and because the IRS
could provide portable duplicating equipment, the use of which would alleviate the
burden of making copies of the bank's records.
" Compare First Nat'l Bank v. United States, 160 F.2d 532 (5th Cir. 1947), with
McGarry v. SEC, 147 F.2d 389 (10th Cir. 1945). The IRS summons in FirstNat'I Bank
was held to be wholly unreasonable in that it required the bank to produce its records
for a period of six years in order for the IRS to determine whether or not any of the
records might bear upon the returns of certain named parties. 160 F.2d at 534. In
contrast, the summons in McGarry was allowed because the records sought were both
relevant and readily identifiable, and covered a more limited period of time.
11McMann v. SEC, 87 F.2d 377, 379 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, McMann v. Engle, 301
U.S. 684 (1937); accord, Venn v. United States, 400 F.2d 207, 211 (5th Cir. 1968). In
Venn an IRS summons directed to a third party sought all records relating to three
checks issued to the third party by the taxpayer, all records relating to the political
campaign in which the taxpayer and third party had participated, and all corporate
records of the third party for 1964. The court enforced the summons as modified to
eliminate the requirement to produce corporate records for 1964.
2
-McMann v. SEC, 87 F.2d 377, 379 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, McMann v. Engel, 301

U.S. 684 (1937).
"Foster v. United States, 265 F.2d 183, 186-87 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 360 U.S. 912
(1959). In Foster the court enforced a summons of books and records of a bank relating
to the accounts of the taxpayer and a foreign corporation since it was clear that those
records might have thrown light upon whether the amounts received by the taxpayer
from the foreign corporation as salary constituted earned income or distribution of
profits.
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54
rather than an idle hope that something may be discovered.

The IRS need not prove unequivocally that the information sought
is relevant. ' Proof of relevance may not be established until the
advance stages of the perfectly legitimate inquiry. To require otherwise "would unduly interfere with the essential task of the IRS to
evaluate the tax liability of taxpayers.' 5
The Fourth Circuit described the summons in Theodore as "unprecedented in its breadth 7 in its demand for copies of all the returns and pertinent workpapers of all the clients for the last three
years. This was said to include 1500 returns of unidentified taxpayers
and accompanying documentation 5s in the possession of or used by
Theodore.5 9 It was indeed arguable that the scope of the summons
placed a potentially onerous burden on Theodore, both in tedium and
expense, particularly in view of the number of clients involved. However, it is difficult to conceive of any materials which would be more
relevant to the possible tax liability of a class of taxpayers than their
tax returns and the workpapers coincident to those returns.
Analyzed solely in terms of the enforceability of third party summonses, it is primarily the volume of documents demanded in
5

'United States v. Harringon, 388 F.2d 520, 524 (2d Cir. 1968).
1A few early administrative summons cases required the investigating agency to
prove the relevance of the material summoned to the matter under inquiry. E.g.,
Hubner v. Tucker, 245 F.2d 35 (9th Cir. 1957); Local 174 v. United States, 240 F.2d
387 (9th Cir. 1956). However, in Civil Aeronautics Bd. v. Hermann, 353 U.S. 322
(1957), the Supreme Court reinstated a district court order to enforce a summons even
though the lower court had made no express finding on the issue of materiality or
relevance. The decision in the Civil Aeronautics case has been interpreted as effectively overruling Hubner and Local 174. Foster v. United States, 265 F.2d 183, 188 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 360 U.S. 912 (1959).
"United States v. Harrington, 388 F.2d 520, 524 (2d Cir. 1968).
17479 F.2d at 754.
5

1Id.
"See note 17 supra. In their appellate brief, counsel for Theodore compiled a
persuasive list of items which could have been used and either retained or returned to
each client after preparation of the returns. The items listed were: bank statements,
check books, paid invoices, notes payable, accounts receivable, accounts payable,
payroll returns, inventory details, minute books, stock registers, statements of stock
transactions, statements of earnings from partnerships, statements of earnings from
estates and trusts, statements of earnings from sub-chapter "S" corporations, statements of earnings from joint ventures, prior years' tax returns, insurance policies,
trustees' statements on pension and profit sharing plans, schedule of accrued expenses,
closing statements on real estate transactions,, W-2's, 1099's, payroll journals, property
tax receipts, statements of interest paid, statements of contributions, depreciation
schedules, work papers, journal entries, general ledgers, cash receipts journals, cash
disbursements journals. Brief for Appellant at 21-22, United States v. Theodore, 479
F.2d 749 (4th Cir. 1973).
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Theodore which seems overbroad. However, as a tax return preparer,
Theodore was in the unique position of being able to turn over to the
IRS a massive volume of information which would be particularly
relevant to the potential tax liability of his clients. Had the IRS
summons demanded the papers relating to particular named taxpayers, it would have been difficult for the court to determine how many
names would be too many and at what point the number, when
magnified by the volume of documents demanded per name, would
make the summons overbroad. This question of whether or not the
voluminous nature of the information sought would necessitate a
denial of judicial enforcement was not explicitly answered. Rather,
the Fourth Circuit seemed to base its refusal to enforce the summons
more solidly on a rejection of the procedural device with which the
IRS cloaked its overbroad summons with an aura of particularity: the
"open-ended""' John Doe summons.
The Enforceability of John Doe Summonses
In order to analyze the enforceability of the John Doe summons
in Theodore, it is helpful to arrange other cases involving John Doe
summonses for examination as a broad spectrum from the enforceable to the unenforceable. The spectrum ranges from the clearly enforceable summonses seeking only the name, or name and identifying
data, such as address or Social Security number, of a particular taxpayer"' or group of taxpayers under investigation,6 2 through those
summonses seeking books and records of a third party which are
relevant or material to the investigation of a particular unidentified
taxpayer,6" to those unenforceable summonses seeking books and records of a third party allegedly relevant to the investigation of a group
of taxpayers identified only by their membership in a class.6 4
F.2d at 755.
'Tillotson v. Boughner, 333 F.2d 515 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 913 (1964).
OUnited States v. Turner, CCH 1973 STAND. FED. TAX REP., U.S. TAX CAS. (73-2,
at 81,536)
9489 (7th Cir. 1973); United States v. Berkowitz, 355 F. Supp. 897 (E.D.
Pa. 1973). See text accompanying notes 116-18 infra.
"Shulze v. Rayunec, 350 F.2d 666 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, Boughner v. Shulze, 382
U.S. 919 (1965).
6t
United States v. Bisceglia, 73-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 82,335 (6th Cir. 1973); United
States v. Theodore, 479 F.2d 749 (4th Cir. 1973); United States v. Humble Oil and
Refining Co., 346 F. Supp. 944 (S.D. Tex. 1972), appeal docketed, No. 72-3029, 5th
Cir., Sept. 25, 1972; Mays v. Davis, 7 F. Supp. 596 (W.D. Pa. 1934). Contra, United
States v. Anderson Clayton and Co., 73-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 81,109 (S.D. Miss. 1973).
6479
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The Fourth Circuit relied upon Tillotson v. Boughner65 as an example of a John Doe summons case which involved a single unidentified taxpayer." In Tillotson, an attorney was summoned to give testimony regarding a large sum of money he had delivered to the IRS in
the form of a cashier's check on behalf of an anonymous taxpayer to
cover an admitted tax liability. The attorney had informed the investigating agent that he had received the payment through a second
attorney, whose name he refused to divulge on the basis of attorneyclient privilege, and that he did not know the identity of the taxpayer.
In the enforcement proceeding,67 the attorney was ordered to conform
to the summons. The district court held that § 7602 "explicitly
authorize[d] an inquiry into the tax liability of any person for any
internal revenue tax" 68 and that there was no requirement that the
identity of such taxpayer must be known. The district court elaborated the grounds for its decision by pointing to the fact that the IRS
had reason to believe unpaid taxes were owed by a taxpayer whose
identity was unknown, but who had admitted a tax liability while
concealing his identity." In affirming, the Seventh Circuit emphasized that the IRS was investigating a particular taxpayer.7 0 "That
his name and whereabouts [were] not known [did] not discount the
fact that a taxpayer exist[ed] whose tax liability the Internal Reve'7
nue Service [had] statutory authority to investigate. 1
The attorney Boughner continued to refuse to divulge the identity
of his client and was cited for contempt.7 2 He eventually prevailed on
the issue of attorney-client privilege in a reversal of his contempt
citation. 3 However, in a companion case, Shulze v. Rayunec, 74 decided the same day, an IRS John Doe summons seeking third party
records which would identify Boughner's client, but directed at the
auditor of the bank which had issued the cashier's check, was enforced despite Boughner's intervention. In enforcing the summons,
the court ordered production of certain bank records which would
relate to the depositing of funds for, and the requisition and issuance
of, the cashier's check. " The summons was in furtherance of an inves-333 F.2d 515 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 913 (1964).
"479 F.2d at 754.
'!Tillotson v. Boughner, 225 F. Supp. 45 (N.D. Ill. 1963).
"Id. at 46 (emphasis in original).
11Id. at 47.
70333
F.2d at 516.
7
71d. (emphasis in original).
7'illotson
v. Boughner, 238 F. Supp. 621 (N.D. Ill. 1965).
7
1Tillotson v. Boughner, 350 F.2d 663 (7th Cir. 1965).
7'350 F.2d 666 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, Boughner v. Shulze, 382 U.S. 919 (1965).
7Id. at 667, 669.
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tigation of John Doe, the particular unknown taxpayer or taxpayers
on whose behalf Boughner had delivered the cashier's check to the
IRS in payment for an admitted tax liability. 6
At the unenforceable end of the spectrum of John Doe summons
cases, the IRS has sought the books and records of a third party which
were alleged to be relevant to the investigation of the tax liability of
a group of taxpayers who could be identified only by their possible
membership in a class. United States v. Humble Oil and Refining
Co. 77 dealt with a John Doe summons 8 requiring the oil company to
produce corporate records which contained information concerning
mineral releases surrendered during the year without production on
the leasehold. 9 The summons required the records to show the name,
address and social security number of the lessor, the amount of lease
bonus, the month and year the lease was executed and the legal
description of the property leased. That information was requested
only for leases in which the lease bonus exceeded ten thousand dollars
for the calendar year 1970.
In refusing to enforce the summons the court placed great emphasis on the representations of the cognizant IRS agent that no particular taxpayers were under investigation. The agent testified that the
purpose of the summons was to conduct research and gather information on local industry and business practices in order to update the
tax enforcement capabilities of the IRS in that business community.80
That characterization proved fatal to the enforceability of the summons. The court ruled that where the prime purpose of the summons
was research, there was no contemplated audit of specific individuals,
and no particular persons or returns were under scrutiny, the summons could not be enforced."' Having held that the statutory powers
of the IRS under § 7602 had been exceeded, the court found it unnecessary to reach the question of whether an enforcement of the summons would bring about an unreasonable search and seizure under
8 2
the fourth amendment.
,'Id. at 667.
7346 F. Supp. 944 (S.D. Tex. 1972), appeal docketed, No. 72-3029, 5th Cir., Sept.
25, 1972.
71Id. at 948, app. A.
71When an oil lease is entered into the, lessor is allowed by §§ 611 through 614 of
the Internal Revenue Code, to take a depletion deduction on the bonus payment which
is received at that time. If the lease is cancelled at a later date without production,
the lessee must restore the depletion allowance to income at the time of cancellation.
"346 F. Supp. 946.
11Id. at 947.
x2Id.
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United States v. Anderson Clayton and Co.8 is in stark contrast
with Humble Oil. The IRS sought and obtained enforcement of a
John Doe summons requiring a soybean company to produce designated corporate records which would identify all taxpayers in Mississippi who had supplied soybeans to the company during the period
January 1, 1970, to December 31, 1971, and show the compensation
each received. The court held that the summons was part of a legitimate "exploratory""' search and investigation by the IRS "for information relating to the tax liability of all farmers in Mississippi who
".
sold soybeans to the [company] within the two year period ....
The court acknowledged divergence of opinion on the issue of enforceability of such a summons but, without citing any other authority,
founded its decision on the broadest reading of § 7601 and § 7602,
holding that those sections empowered the IRS to determine the liability of all persons and to examine any books.86 On the basis of the
disclosures in the brief opinion, it appears that the court issued an
overbroad order and that it erred. It viewed the case before it from
the isolated perspective of the statutes and failed to justify its decision in light of the cases examined here.87
In Tillotson8 and Shulze, 89 the touchstone of enforceability of a
John Doe summons directed at a third party was the particularlity
with which the existence of the taxpayer could be established. In
contrast, the fundamental bar to enforcement in Humble Oil was the
inability of the IRS to establish that it was investigating the tax
liability of particular taxpayers who were unidentified, instead of
doing research in a business area to update the enforcement of tax
compliance.
In Theodore, the Fourth Circuit articulated its version of the par1173-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 81,109 (S.D. Miss. 1973).
x"d.
xId.

1Id. at 81,109-110 (emphasis in original). The court stated, "[t]here is some
divergence of opinion on this question, but this court is firmly of the opinion and
conviction that the statute means and intends exactly what it says." Id. at 81,109.
'The court concluded,
[tihose statutes are implemented by federal regulations having the
force and effect of law which provide the purpose and objective of the
departmental summons. Nowhere in the act or any regulation having
the force and effect of law is there to be found any requirement that
the records sought to be examined must be records relating to the tax
liability of any particular person.
Id. at 81,110.
" 333 F.2d 515.
"350 F.2d 666.
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ticularity touchstone in interpreting the statutory language of
§ 7602. After quoting the pertinent parts of the section, the court
stated, "[wie hold that this language only allows IRS to summon
information relating to the correctness of a particularreturn or to a
particularperson and does not authorize the use of open-ended Joe
[sic] Doe summonses."90 The court did not elaborate its holding with
an analysis of the newly-coined term "open-ended."'" Since this
statement apparently represents the crux of the Theodore holding,
the court should have provided an adequate analysis of the particularity standard as it applied to the facts of Theodore and a definition
of the term "open-ended."
Some sense of what the Fourth Circuit could have meant by
"open-ended" can be ascertained by a comparison of Theodore,
Humble Oil, 92 and Anderson Clayton.9 3 In Humble Oil and Anderson
Clayton, the IRS apparently alleged no specific events or transactions
giving reason to suspect the classes of oil leaseholders or farmers were
liable for tax deficiencies. Rather, the two investigations were characterized as research and an exploratory search, respectively. In
Theodore, the discovery of errors and inaccuracies in the return prepared for the undercover IRS agent by Theodore gave the IRS reason
to suspect the correctness of other returns94 prepared by the Theodore
firm. Assuming the investigations in Humble Oil and Anderson Clayton were based on such a reason to suspect, as was the one in
Theodore, the only relationship between the events and the unnamed
persons in the three cases would have been based upon those persons'
membership in a class of oil leaseholders, soybean suppliers, or preparer's clients. In order to reach the records of unknown taxpayers,
whose existence the revenue agent could not establish with particularity, the IRS summoned records relating to the affairs of all members of the classes of which the particular taxpayers were members.
In that sense the summonses could be labelled "open-ended," not
relating to particular persons, and unenforceable.9 5
"479 F.2d at 755 (emphasis added).
91d.

12346 F. Supp. 944.
173-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 81,109.
"See United States v. Turner, CCH 1973 STAND. FED. TAX REP., U.S. TAX CAS.
(73-2, at 81-536, 81,541)
9489 (7th Cir. 1973). In Turner, another Tax Return Preparers Project case, the court found that the incorrect return discovered in the undercover
project "caused the [IRS] to suspect the correctness of the other returns [the preparer] prepared for his clients in 1970 and 1971."
"SItwas the "open-ended" nature of the summons in Anderson Clayton which the
district court failed to recognize in that case and which should have rendered that
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Assuming that the Fourth Circuit's application of the label "openended" to the John Doe summons in Theodore was a clarification of
the court's holding rather than a carelessly redundant expression of
terms which the court considered synonymous, the court apparently
conceded the enforceability of non "open-ended" John Doe summonses of third party records under § 7602. In finding the John Doe
summons in Theodore "open-ended," not particular, and unenforceable,9" the court implied that there might be a case in which the unnamed taxpayers could be sufficiently particularized to render a John
Doe summons of third party records non "open-ended" and therefore
enforceable. Admittedly, such a case would be unusual. The unnamed taxpayer or taxpayers under investigation would have to be
uniquely discernable as taxpaying entities because of the particularity with which they could be delineated. A John Doe summons which
sought a third party's records relating to the tax liability of such a
uniquely discernable taxpayer or group of taxpayers would be the
virtual equivalent of a summons of third party records relating to a
named taxpayer because the taxpayer's existence could be established with certainty. For example, in Shulze v. Rayunec, 7 the unnamed taxpayer under investigation was so uniquely delineated by
the delivery to the IRS of the anonymous cashier's check in payment
of his admitted tax liability that a John Doe summons of bank records which would reveal his identity was enforced.
In United States v. Bisceglia,8 decided after Theodore, the Sixth
Circuit reversed a pre-Theodore district court order9 which had enforced a John Doe summons of third party records. The IRS had
summoned a bank to produce those records which would facilitate an
investigation of the potential tax liability of the unknown depositor
or depositors of two shipments of twenty thousand dollars in old or
deteriorated one hundred dollar bills which had been shipped by the
bank to a Federal Reserve Bank.' After applying the battery of tests
summons unenforceable in light of Theodore and Humble Oil. See text accompanying
notes 83-87 supra.
"1479 F.2d at 755.
'1350 F.2d 666.
"United States v. Bisceglia, 73-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 82,335 (6th Cir. 1973).
"United States v. Bisceglia, 72-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 84,643 (E.D. Ky. 1972).
"The investigation was premised on the theory that the deposits were a potential
indication of tax liability because of the similarity of the condition of the bills to those
in a previous incident in which the bills were cached in a milk can for several years
and in which investigation revealed a tax liability. In addition, the cash shipment to
the Federal Reserve Bank was very large in comparison to the normal business of the
bank. Brief for Appellee at 4, United States v. Bisceglia, 73-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 82,335
(6th Cir. 1973).
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for enforceability of third party summonses," ' the district court ordered the bank to produce those records which could reasonably be
expected to relate to the investigation, "in a manner least burdensome to the bank and least calculated to unnecessarily reveal the
affairs of the bank's customers whose transactions were not related
to [the] investigation."'' 0 Specifically, the order compelled production of those deposit tickers which reflected cash deposits during a
one-month period in the amount of twenty thousand dollars and
those reflecting cash deposits involving one hundred dollar bills totalling amounts equal to or in excess of five thousand dollars. 0 3 The
district court based its decision on an analysis of the burden which
would be placed on the bank and framed its order in terms aimed at
alleviating that burden. 0 The court apparently did not examine the
particularity with which the unnamed depositor or depositors must
be discerned.
In reversing the district court in Bisceglia, the Sixth Circuit 05found that the IRS had not made the requisite demonstration for the
enforcement of a § 7602 "summons - that it [sought] third party
records pertaining to the income tax liability of a particular taxpayer. " '" Instead, the court found that the summons would have
enabled the IRS "to inquire into the financial affairs of a group of
unspecified persons in the hope of identifying one or more of them
. . ." as the depositor or depositors of the deteriorated bills.
The gist of the requirement established in Bisceglia seems to be
that the IRS must have discerned the unnamed parties as particular
taxpayers before proceeding with a John Doe summons under § 7602.
The IRS was not authorized to examine records relating to the financial affairs of an indefinite number of unspecified persons having
common characteristics for the purpose of ascertaining the identity
of one or some of those persons who might have been taxpayers liable
for taxes."'
The Fourth Circuit's prohibition against "open-ended" John Doe
summonses ' in Theodore is commensurate with the Sixth Circuit's
stricture against examinations of third party records of the affairs of
an indefinite number of unspecified persons"" in Bisceglia. The courts
protected the privacy of third party records relating to the affairs of
"See text accompanying notes 48-56 supra.
1"172-1 U.S. Tax Cas. at 84,644.
1"Id. at 84,645.
"'Id. at 84,644.
"'United States v. Bisceglia, 73-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 82,335 (6th Cir. 1973).
""Id. at 82,340.
'"'Id.
'"Id. at 82,337-340.
1"479 F.2d at 755.
"'73-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 82,338.
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an open-ended class, or group of unspecified persons when the IRS
attempted to summon records relating to the entire class or group in
furtherance of an investigation of unspecified members of the class
or group.
Both the Fourth and Sixth Circuits based their conclusions on
statutory interpretations of § 7602"' which left the IRS without authority to issue the John Doe summonses in question. Having found
that the summonses were without statutory authority, neither court
reached the constitutional question of whether the summonses would
have constituted an unreasonable search and seizure in violation of
the fourth amendment."' However, in Theodore, the court concluded
an examination of the residual fourth amendment restrictions on
administrative summonses of third party records with an interpretation of § 7602. Thus, the court implied that an interpretation of
§ 7602 which authorized an "open-ended" John Doe summons of
third party records would have been in conflict with the fourth

amendment.'

'3

Theodore on Remand
The Fourth Circuit agreed with the district court that the IRS
had ample power to obtain the names, addresses and social security
numbers of the clients by the use of a § 7602 summons if, on remand,
it was determined that the information was not otherwise accessible
to the IRS in its own files."' In effect, the court modified the summons to demand only names, addresses and social security numbers
of the clients and conditionally enforced it as modified." 5
"'Compare 479 F.2d at 755, with 73-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 82,338.
112479 F.2d at 755; 73-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 82,337.
113479 F.2d at 754-55.

"'Id. at 755; see note 39 supra. The third criterion set forth in United States v.
Powell, 379 U.S. 48, 57-58 (1964), for the enforcement of IRS summonses requires "that
the information sought is not already in the Commissioner's possession." In accordance
with this stricture the Fourth Circuit remanded the Theodore case to the district court
for a determination of whether the IRS had any reasonable or practical means at its
disposal to compile the lists of names and social security numbers of Theodore's
clients. 479 F.2d at 755.
1"The Fourth Circuit stated that the IRS sought a list of the names, addresses and
social security numbers. The court then gave remand instructions to enforce the summons to the extent it demanded such a list if it should be determined that the information was not otherwise accessible to the IRS. The list is not demanded in the summons
and the opinion does not clarify how such a list came into existence. A sealed list of
Theodore's clients was deposited with the district court in the interim between the
district court enforcement proceeding and the filing for an appeal to the Fourth Circuit. This action was taken to forestall contempt proceedings against Theodore for
failure to obey the enforcement order of the district court. In the Government's appellate brief it argued that if the requirements of the summons for returns and related
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If the modified summons is enforced on remand, Theodore will be
brought precisely in line with two other Tax Return Preparers Project
7
'
cases. In United States v. Turner" and United States v. Berkowitz,"
only lists of the names and social security numbers of the preparers'
clients were demanded by John Doe summonses. The summonses in
those cases were enforced, and in Berkowitz the court specifically
addressed the issue on which Theodore was remanded, holding that
it would be impossible or unjustifiably difficult for the IRS to compile
the lists from its own files."58
Conclusion
The IRS, like other administrative agencies, has broad inquisitorial powers. However, the IRS has not been allowed to exceed its
statutory authority to issue administrative summonses. The Fourth
and Sixth Circuits in Theodore and Bisceglia found the administrative summons power of § 7602 unavailable to the IRS in those cases
in which the potential taxpayers, about whom a third party was
ordered to furnish records, could not be discerned with particularity
or specificity. The third party could not be required to furnish records
relating to the financial affairs of a class or group of unspecified
persons in order that the IRS could select from those records information on the members of the class or group which had been previously
identifiable to the IRS only by the characteristic of membership.
When the Fourth Circuit modified the Theodore summons and
conditionally enforced it as modified, it did not alter that facet of the
summons which the court had characterized as "open-ended." The
unnamed clients about whom the summons sought information remained non-particularized; but the Fourth Circuit enforced the
"open-ended" John Doe summons insofar as it demanded that Theodore produce a list of the names, addresses and social security numworkpapers were deemed unreasonable, the Government should at least be allowed
access to the list of taxpayers held in camera by the district court. Brief for Appellee
at 18 n.5, United States v. Theodore, 479 F.2d 749 (4th Cir. 1973).
"'CCH 1973 STAND. FED. TAX REP., U.S. TAX CAS. (73-2, at 81,536) 9489 (7th
Cir. 1973).
17355 F. Supp. 897 (E.D. Pa. 1973).
"'Id. at 901. In Theodore the court refrained from deciding whether or not the
names, addresses and social security numbers could be compiled from the IRS files
and remanded the case on this issue alone. 479 F.2d at 755. In oral argument counsel
for Theodore had argued that the 1972 tax returns carried a preparer's identification
number which would enable the IRS to retrieve all papers prepared by Theodore in
1972 from IRS files. Counsel argued further that 90 percent of the clients from 19691971 were also clients in 1972 and, therefore, that the number of names which could
not be obtained from IRS files would be de minimis. Telephone interview with William
B. Shearer, Jr., Counsel for Theodore Accounting Service, P.A., Greenville, South
Carolina, October 16, 1973.
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bers of all of his clients. Thus, the court distinguished between third
party records which would shed light on unnamed taxpayers' returns
or affairs and information in the possession of third parties which
would merely identify the taxpayer for investigation by the IRS
through its own resources. According to Theodore, the IRS is authorized to summon the latter with an "open-ended" John Doe summons
but not the former." 9
Through its interpretation of § 7602 in Theodore, the Fourth Circuit circumscribed a potential abuse of the broad summons power of
the IRS. If the court had determined that § 7602 authorized "openended" John Doe summonses, virtually any third party records relating to the financial affairs of other parties whom the IRS wished to
investigate would have been vulnerable to IRS demands for production and inspection. In order to obtain enforcement of its "openended" John Doe summonses, the IRS would only have had to describe a particular class of indefinite size, summon the third party
records pertaining to that class, and then pick and choose among the
records to determine which members of the class were worthy of
further investigation. The lure of easy access to third party compilations of the records of financial affairs of unknown parties could have
led the IRS to thrust an unreasonable burden upon third parties,
particularly financial and accounting institutions. Even if Congress
broadened § 7602 to authorize the IRS to exercise such powers of
inquisition through the use of "open-ended" John Doe summonses,
it seems probable that the courts would find that authorization violative of the fourth amendment protection against unreasonable
searches and seizures.
ROBERT NOEL CLINARD

"'Two weeks after the Fourth Circuit's decision in Theodore, the Government filed
an unreported motion to modify the opinion. The objective of the motion was to
forestall any legal difficulty the IRS might encounter in obtaining the returns and other
documents in Theodore's possession once the taxpayers were identified, whether by
Theodore's list or by a search through IRS files. The motion, filed June 14, 1973, urged
that "the decision reversing and remanding this case with instructions, shall be without prejudice to future application by the appellees for the production by the appellants of retained copies of tax returns and such other documents described in the
Internal Revenue summons in question which, upon identification of individual
clients, may be necessary to a determination by the Internal Revenue Service of the
correctness of tax returns prepared by appellants for such identified taxpayers . .. ."
The motion was denied. The Fourth Circuit filed an order July 3, 1973, stating that
the motion had asked for a modification of the opinion "upon a statement of hypothetical facts which may or may not exist in the future." The court was of the opinion that
the modification would be an advisory opinion.

